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NOTES AND COMMENTS
court, the decision must be binding on other state courts and also must
be printed in available form.
With these factors as a guide a decision of the Superior Court of
North Carolina, for example, apparently would not be binding on a
federal court in the determination of the law of the state in the absence
of a decision on the point by the Supreme Court of North Carolina,
but mere evidence of the law of the state. The status of the Superior
Court of North Carolina is very similar to that of the Court of Common
Pleas of South Carolina. It is denominated a court of record, but its
decisions are recorded only in the local courthouse of the county and
are not reprinted or digested in any way which would make them ac-
cessible to the bar or other inferior courts. Further, a decision by one
Superior Court in North Carolina is not binding on another Superior
Court in this state. The court does not have statewide jurisdiction
within the meaning set forth in the United States Supreme Court opin-
ions in that, while it does have jurisdiction over all the citizens of North
Carolina, it has jurisdiction to try only such cases that are triable within
the county in which the court is located.
2 5
A. A. ZOLLICOFFER, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort Liability-Notice of Injury
Requirements
More than half of the states have statutes of general application
requiring that notice of tort claims against municipalities be given within
certain fixed time limits to designated city officials.' The requirement
is also frequently found in municipal charters, but no notice is necessary
in the absence of legal provision so requiring.
2
North Carolina has a statute3 requiring that a prior demand be made
upon the proper municipal authorities before suing a city, county, town,
or other municipal corporation, but it expressly applies only to debts
or demands arising out of contract where the damages are liquidated.
Another statute4 requires that claims against counties, cities, and towns
" N. C. GEN STAT. §§1-76 to, 1-82 (1943).
'Peterson, Governmental Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L.
Rrv. 700, 701 (1942). For a list of states see Sahm, Tort Notice of Claim to
Municipalities, 46 DIcx. L. REv. 1 n. 2 (1941).
26 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2888 (2d ed. 1937); WHITE, NEG-
LIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §665 (1920).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §153-64 (1943). judicial decisions restricted the operation
of this statute to contract actions long before it was expressly limited in this re-
gard. E.g., Sugg v. Greenville, 169 N. C. 606, 86 S. E. 695 (1915) ; Neal v.
Marion, 126 N. C. 412, 35 S. E. 812 (1900) ; Sheldon v. Asheville, 119 N. C. 606,
25 S. E. 781 (1896); Frisby v. Marshall, 119 N. C. 570, 26 S. E. 251 (1896);
Shields v. Durham, 118 N. C. 450, 24 S. E. 794 (1896) ; McINTOsH, NORTH CARO-
LrNA PRAcTIcE AND PROCEDURE §389 (1929).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §1-53 (1947 Supp.) : "All claims against counties, cities
and towns of this state shall be presented to the chairman of the board of county
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be presented to designated officials within two years after maturity or
be forever barred, but this statute has never been construed as applicable
to tort actions. 5 Both of these statutes will bar an action to which they
are applicable unless the requirements they impose are met.6
Unless authorized by statute or charter, a municipality has no power
to require notice of claims before suits thereon shall be brought against
it,7 and even where a city has home rule powers the decisions have
been against the existence of a power to establish a notice requirement
by local action.8 Several North Carolina cities and towns have notice
of injury provisions in their charters. 9 Some have prior presentment
commissioners, or to the chief officers of the cities and towns, within two years
after the maturity of such claims, or the holders shall be forever barred from a
recovery thereon; provided, however, that the provisions of this paragraph shall
not apply to claims based upon bonds, notes, and interest coupons, except claims
based upon bonds, notes, and interest coupons ... which mature after March first,
one thousand nine hundred forty-five... .
' This latter statute was enacted in 1875, the act being entitled "An Act to As-
certain the Indebtedness of the Different Counties, Cities and Towns of this State,
and to prescribe a Statute of Limitations." N. C. Pub. Laws 1674-5, c. 243. It
became N. C. CODE §756 (1883), and the statute on "prior presentation of debts
and demands" (construed not to apply to tort actions at an early date, see note 3
supra) immediately followed as N. C. CODE §757 (1883), both appearing with
statutes concerning county revenue. Sec. 4 provided that it should not apply to
any county whose debts were already audited and ascertained. The first case
construing this statute set out its object as being "to enable the municipal bodies
mentioned to make a record of their valid outstanding obligations, and to separate
them from the spurious and illegal." Wharton v. Commissioners, 82 N. C. 12
(1880). It seems clear that the statute was passed to meet an emergency in the
financial affairs of municipal bodies brought about by the Civil War. Royster v.
Commissioners, 98 N. C. 148, 153, 3 S. E. 739, 741 (1887) (dissenting opinion).
In the N. C. REvISAL (1905), the statute on "prior demand before suit" remained
in the chapter on county government (present G.S. §153-64). The statute on
"presentation within two years or action will be barred" was moved to the chapter
on statutes of limitation, where it is located today (G.S. §1-53). While the for-
mer was many times construed to apply only to contract actions, the latter was
not construed as to this point. The court has cited G.S. §1-53 when dealing with
nuisance cases, but the bare citation without comment plus the possibility of a
contract theory of the action do not make very strong authority for the proposition
that this statute applies to tort as well as contract actions. Moore v. Charlotte, 204
N. C. 37, 39, 167 S. E. 380, 381 (1933) ; Lightner v. Raleigh, 206 N. C. 496, 503,
174 S. E. 272, 276 (1934) ; Ivester v. Winston-Salem, 215 N. C. 1, 7, 1 S. E. 2d
88, 91 (1939). In Moore v. Charlotte, supra, the tort theory was held barred by
the city charter provision as to notice of injury. This would have been unneces-
sary had the statute under discussion barred the tort action. The origin of G.S.
§1-53, its early association with G.S. §153-64, the fact that both use language more
properly concerned with contract such as "claim," "maturity," and "holders," the
original proviso that it should not apply to any county whose debts were already
audited and ascertained, the original title of the act, its object being described by
the Court in terms of "valid and outstanding obligations" and "valid debts" all
indicate a confinement of this statute to contract claims. Such a construction
would be in accord with the majority view concerning such statutes. 6 McQuiL-
LIN, op. cit. supra note 2, §§2629, 2890. See IV DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORA-
TiONS §1613 (5th ed. 1911).
'MACINTosH, op. cit. supra note 3, §§187, 384, and 389.
'6 MCQUILLIN, op. cit. supra note 2, §2629.
'Note 170 A. L. R. 237 (1947) ; 20 NAT. MUNIC. REv. 608, 726 (1931).
'E.g., N. C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1939, c. 366, §59 (Charlotte) : "No action for dam-
ages against said city of any character whatever, to either person or property, shall
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of claim provisions which would seem to be merely local versions of
N. C. GEN. STAT. §153-64 (1943), though they are not expressly limited
to contract claims.10 Notice of injury, whether required by statute or
charter, should be sharply distinguished from the prior notice of de-
fects which must be proved in order to sustain municipal liability for
injury resulting from defective condition of streets and sidewalks.-"
Some notice of injury charter provisions are expressly limited to
torts, but the typical provision is not expressly so limited. Yet the
language is such as to logically restrict its operation to the field of tort,
though ihere is some support for a different view.' 2 On the assumption
that the notice provision only applied to tort, the plaintiff in Stephens
Co. v. Charlotte,'3 who had failed to give notice in time, amended his
be instituted against said city, unless within ninety (90) days after the happening or
infliction of the injury complained of, the complainant, his executors or administra-
tors, shall have given notice to the city council of said city of such injury in
writing, stating in such notice the date and place of happening or infliction of
such injury, the manner of such infliction, the character of the injury and the
amount of damages claimed therefor, but this shall not prevent any time of limi-
tation prescribed by law from commencing to run at the date of happening or in-
fliction of such injury or in ahy manner interfere with its running." The follow-
ing charter provisions are substantially the same as that of Charlotte: N. C. Priv.
Laws 1913, c. 59, art. XXII, §2 (Raleigh); N. C. Priv. Laws 1901, c. 100, §103
(Asheville) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1935, c. 122, §2 (Statesville) ; N. C. Priv. Laws
1929, c. 196, §69 (Thomasville); N. C. Priv. Laws 1931, c. 34, §2 (Black Moun-
tain); N. C. Priv. Laws 1929, c. 204 (Rocky Mount, also provides that action
barred if not brought within one year) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1927, c. 26, §2 (Morgan-
ton); N. C. Priv. Laws Ex. Sess. 1924, c. 8, §3 (Landis). The following are
provisions for a notice period of six months, but otherwise similar to the quoted
provision: N. C. Priv. Laws 1923, c. 37, §82A (Greensboro) ; N. C. Priv. Laws
1931, c. 171, §2 (High Point, which also provides that no action shall be brought
within 30 days after notice).
N. C. Priv. Laws 1927, c. 232, §115 (Winston-Salem): "All claims or demands
against the city of Winston-Salem arising in tort shall be presented to the board
of aldermen of said city or to the mayor, in writing, signed by the claimant, his
attorney, or agent, within 90 days after said claim or demand is due or the cause
of action accrues; that no suit or action shall be brought thereon within 10 days
or after the expiration of 12 months from the time said claim is so presented, and
unless the claim is so presented within 90 days after the cause of action accrued,
and unless suit is brought within 12 months thereafter, an action thereon shall be
barred." The following charter requirements are substantially the same as the
Winston-Salem provision: N. C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1939, c. 466, §141Y (Elizabeth
City); N. C. Priv. Laws 1935, c. 105 (Burlington) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1933, c.
18 (Gastonia). Two recent notice provisions may herald a longer period for
filing notice in future legislation on this subject: N. C. Pub. Loc. Laws 1941, c.
476 (Wilmington, 365 days period and applies only to personal injuries); N. C.
Pub. Loc. Laws 1941, c. 253 (Marion, 180 days period with notice to be given by
guardian or next friend if infant or insane).
"0E.g., N. C. Priv. Laws 1913, c. 59, art. XXII, §1 (Raleigh) ; N. C. Priv.
Laws 1901, c. 100, §102 (Aiheville) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1921, c. 142, §48r/ (Dur-
ham); N. C. Priv. Laws 1931, c. 34, §1 (Black Mountain); N. C. Priv. Laws
1923, c. 37, §81 (Greensboro) ; N. C. Priv. Laws 1927, c. 26, §1 (Morganton);
N. C. Priv. Laws Ex. Sess. 1924, c. 8, §2 (Landis).
' MACIN OSH, op. cit. supra. note 3, §390; 6 McQuImLIN, op. cit. spra note 2,
§2887; Salim, supra note 1, at 9.
"See Perry v. High Point, 218 N. C. 714, 718, 12 S. E. 2d 275, 278 (1940)
(by implication) ; MACINTOSH, op. cit. supra note 3, §389.
13201 N. C. 258, 159 S. E. 414 (1931).
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complaint for the taking of his water lines by the city to allege that the
city took and used his lines and thus became indebted to the plaintiff
"by virtue of an implied promise or agreement on its part to pay the
plaintiff." The court did not indicate that the change in theory of
recovery made the difference, but held that the notice provision does
not cover a claim for compensation arising out of the physical appro-
priation of property for public use. The rule now seems established
that where property is taken by eminent domain powers, a suit for
compensation is not subject to a notice of injury charter provision.14
Where the action is based on a permanent trespass or nuisance the
notice requirement must be met,1 but the requirement has only limited
operation if the trespass or nuisance is continuing or recurring.1' In
this latter situation, even if notice was given, damages suffered prior to
the beginning of the notice of injury period were once held not recover-
able.'12 But this position was abandoned in favor of the view that the
notice requirement was designed to affect the claimant's right to main-
.tain his action only in reference to the time during which it should be
commenced, so if notice is given only the damages barred by the statute
of limitations are irrecoverable.' 8 Provisions requiring prior present-
ment of -claims are frequently found in charters also having notice of
injury provisions,' 9 thus supporting the conclusion that prior present-
ment of claim requirements apply only to claims based on contract.
Since N. C. GEN STAT. §153-64 (1943) is in practically identical lan-
guage and was so construed 20 prior to the insertion of an express limi-
tation to contract actions, there seems to be no field in which these
charter provisions can be given effect that is not already covered by this
statute.
Notice of injury provisions are universally upheld as valid and con-
stitutional as long as the period for giving it is not so short as to deprive
the party injured of a substantial remedy.2' The North Carolina Su-
"' Charlotte Consolidated Const. Co. v. Charlotte, 208 N. C. 309, 180 S. E. 573
(1935) ; cf. Ivester v. Winston-Salem, 215 N. C. 1, 1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939) (a
nuisance case which amounts to a taking). But cf. Briggs v. Asheville, 198 N. C.
271, 151 S. E. 199 (1930).
"Wallace v. Asheville, 208 N. C. 74, 179 S. E. 18 (1935)'; Peacock v. Greens-
boro, 196 N. C. 412, 146 S. E. 3 (1928) ; Dayton v. Asheville, 185 N. C. 12, 115
S. E. 827 (1923).
" Ivester v. Winston-Salem, 215 N. C. 1, 1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939) ; Lightner v.
Raleigh, 206 N. C. 496, 174 S. E. 272 (1934). This result is reached because such
continuing and recurring injuries give rise to new causes of action all along. No
matter when notice was given, if the nuisance was still causing injury then the.no-
tice would necessarily be within the time allowed for giving notice.1 7Smith v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 178, 126 S. E. 514 (1925).
18 Ivester v. Winston-Salem 215 N. C. 1, 1 S. E. 2d 88 (1939) ; Lightner v.
Raleigh, 206 N. C. 496, 174 S. E. 272 (1934) ; see Chief Justice Hoke dissenting
in Smith v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 178, 126 S. E. 514 (1925).
'o See notes 9 and 10 supra. "0 See note 3 .supra.




preme Court has described a ninety days' notice requirement as reason-
able, with no necessity for showing the plaintiff to have actually known
of it in order for his failure to give notice to defeat his action.
22
Typically, the notice provision requires the notice to be in writing,
stating the date, place, manner of infliction of the injury, the character
of the injury, and the amount of damages claimed.23 Substantial com-
pliance is sufficient where there is nothing to mislead the defendant as
to the basis of the action, and a notice containing date, place, and amount
of damages claimed has been held sufficient where the city had ample
knowledge of the cause of the injury.24 The notice need not be drawn
with the technical nicety of pleading,2 5 and the action need not be
brought during the notice period,26 though North Carolina has not de-
cided whether the complaint will suffice for the notice in this event.
2 7
Sufficiency of the notice is a question of law,2 8 but proof of notice is for
the jury where the evidence is conflicting.
29
The notice must be served on the officials designated in the charter,
usually the governing body. A claim addressed to and served on the
city manager was held not to be presented to the "lawful municipal
authorities," 30 though a charter requiring notice to be served on the
city council was held to have been complied with where the notice was
addressed'to that body but was served on the city manager, the rule
being stated that when the governing body specified is not in session
notice directed to them and delivered to the officer having care and
custody of the records and files is a sufficient compliance.31 Personal
knowledge of the injury by the city officials is not sufficient, nor can
the body designated waive notice or by words or conduct estop the
municipality from taking advantage of failure to give notice.8 2 The
person injured must give the notice or it must be given for him, and
one not named as claimant in the notice cannot sustain the action.83
2 Hartsell v. Asheville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226 (1913), reh. allowed on
other grounds, 166 N. C. 633, 82 S. E. 946 (1914).
23 See note 9 supra.
24 Peacock v. Greensboro, 196 N. C. 412, 146 S. E. 3 (1928) ; Graham v. Char-
lotte, 186 N. C. 649, 120 S. E. 466 (1923).
2 See note 24 supra.20Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N. C. 321, 22 S. E. 2d 900 (1942).
27 For criticism of this practice in other jurisdictions see Sahm, supra note 1, at
4. In states where the notice is held to'be a condition precedent to the right to
bring an action, it has generally been held that the filing of the suitjs not a sub-
stitute for the notice. Note, 101 A.L.R. 726 (1936).
28 6 MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2895.
" Cresler v. Asheville, 134 N. C. 311, 46 S. E. 738 (1904).
' 0Nevins v. Lexington, 212 N. C. 616, 194 S. E. 293 (1937).
" Perry v. High Point, 218 N. C. 714, 12 S. E. 2d 275 (1940).
" Pender v. Salisbury, 160 N. C. 363, 76 S. E. 228 (1912). Notes, 82 A.L.R.
749 (1933) ; 153 A.L.R. 329 (1944) ; 31 MINN. L. REv. 751 (1947).
" Virginia Trust Co. v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 162, 176 S. E. 257 (1934) (damage
to land, notice being given by owner of equity of redemption but suit being brought
by trustee in deed of trust) ; Note, 63 A.L.R. 1080 (1929).
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A failure to give notice within the time fixed by charter does not
defeat the cause of action where the plaintiff is mentally or physically
unable to present it during that period by reason of the injury and did
present it within a reasonable time after he was able to do so, but the
injured person is not excused if he is able to give notice through others
or is not disabled during the entire period.3 4 North Carolina has not
considered whether infancy or insanity would excuse, but the weight of
authority seems to be that it would not unless statute or charter pro-
vided otherwise.3 5
The majority rule is that compliance with notice statutes and charter
provisions is a condition precedent to the institution of an action against
a municipal corporation, and that compliance must not only be proved
but a failure to allege that notice was given as required will render the
complaint demurrable.3 6 Until recently, only one state has consistently
held to the contrary view that failure to give notice is a matter of de-
fense and not a condition precedent.3
7
In a recent case,38 the plaintiff brought an action against a city
for damages suffered as a result of a fall allegedly caused by a hole
"' Foster v. Charlotte, 206 N. C. 528, 74 S. E. 412 (1934). Hartsell v. Ashe-
ville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226 (1913), reh. allowed, 166 N. C. 633, 82 S. E.
946 (1914); Terrell v. Washington, 158 N. C. 282, 73 S. E.'888 (1912); see
Webster v. Charlotte, 222 N. C. 321, 22 S. E. 2d 900 (1942).
"5Notes, 109 A.L.R. 975 (1937), 59 A.L.R. 411 (1929), 31 A.L.R. 619 (1924);
6 MCQUILLIx, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §2893; Peterson, supra note 1, at 715;
Notes, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 867 (1932), 36 MICH. L. REv. 502 (1938). Terrell v.
Washington, 158 N. C. 282, 73 S. E. 888 (1912) is frequently cited by writers for
the proposition that general legal incapacity will excuse, but no such question was
before the court and though some of the statements in that opinion are broad, they
support the proposition as dicta, if at all.
"E.g., Barnett v. Elizabeth City, 222 N. C. 760, 24 S. E. 2d 264 (1943) ; Web-
ster v. Charlotte, 222 N. C. 321, 22 S. E. 2d 900 (1942) ; Virginia Trust Co. v.
Asheville, 207 N. C. 162, 175 S. E. 257 (1934) ; Foster v. Charlotte, 206 N. C.
528, 174 S. E. 412 (1934); Hartsell v. Asheville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226
(1913), reh. allowed on other grounds, 166 N. C. 633, 82 S. E. 946 (1914) ; Pender
v. Salisbury, 160 N. C. 363, 76 S. E. 228 (1912) ; Cresler v. Asheville, 134 N. C.
311, 46 S. E. 738 (1904); Maise v. Gadsden, 232 Ala. 82, 166 So. 795 (1936);
Marino v. East Haven, 120 Conn. 577, 182 Atl. 225 (1935) ; Russell v. Wilming-
ton, 35 Del. 193, 162 At. 71 (1932) ; Williams v. Jacksonville, 118 Fla. 671, 160
So. 15 (1935), Cuvelier v. Dumont, 221 Iowa 667, 266 N. W. 517 (1936) ; Des-
chant v. Hays, 112 Kan. 729, 212 Pac. 682 (1923) ; Galloway v. Winchester, 299
Ky. 87, 184 S. W. 2d 890 (1944) ; Huntington v. Calais, 105 Me. 144, 73 Atl. 829
(1909); O'Connell v. Cambridge, 258 Mass. 203, 154 N. E. 760 (1927); Gable
v. Detroit, 226 Mich. 261, 197 N. W. 169 (1924) ; Johnson v. Chisholm, 222 Minn.
179, 24 N. W. 2d 232 (1946) ; Harms v. Beatrice, 142 Neb. 219, 5 N. W. 2d 287
(1942); Sweeney v. New York, 225 N. Y. 271, 122 N. E. 243 (1919), reversing
173 App. Div. 984, 159 N. Y. Supp. 1145 (2d Dep't 1916) (memorandum decision);
Lane v. Cray, 50 R. I. 486, 149 Atl. 593 (1930) ; Knoxville v. Felding, 153 Tenn.
586, 285 S. W. 47 (1926); Waco v. Watkins, 292 S. W. 583 (Tex. Civ. App.
1927) ; Duschaine v. Everett, 5 Wash. 2d 181, 105 P. 2d 18 (1940) ; Hay v. Bara-
boo, 127 Wis. 1, 105 N. W. 654 (1905).
"' Cole v. St. Joseph, 50 S. W. 2d 623 (Mo. 1932) ; Brown v. Kirksville, 294
S. W. 436 (Mo. App. 1928) ; Branchetti v. Luce, 222 Mo. App. 282, 2 S. W. 2d 129
(1928) ; Beane v. St. Joseph, 211 Mo. App. 200, 240 S. W. 840 (1922) ; Adelman
v. Altman, 209 Mo. App. 583, 240 S. W. 272 (1922)." South Norfolk v. Dail, 47 S. E. 2d 405 (Va. 1948).
[Vol. 27
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in the sidewalk of one of the streets of the city. Plaintiff recovered
below, and on appeal the defendant city contended for the first time
that the lower court had no jurisdiction to try "the case inasmuch as the
plaintiff had failed to allege that notice of injury was given as required
by statute and charter. Recognizing that the law of Virginia had been
that a failure to allege notice was fatal to an action, the Virginia Court
overruled their previous decisions and held that such a notice require-
ment is not a condition precedent to the right to institute an action and,
therefore, the defendant had raised the question too late. In the words
of he court, "after mature consideration we have reached the conclusion
that this holding is harsh and unreasonable, and should be modified.
* . . The failure to make the allegation of notice should be taken ad-
vantage of by the city as a matter of defense to the action." It follows
that failure to plead the defense resulted in waiver of it, since the matter
was not put in issue. The present North Carolina rule is thus sharply
opposed to the law as announced by the Virginia Court.
Several reasons have been advanced to justify the notice of injury
requirement: (1) to prevent fraud by giving municipal authorities an
early opportunity to investigate such claims while the evidence is fresh,3 9
(2) to enable" the city to determine whether or not it should admit
liability and undertake to settle the claim without suit4o and, (3) to en-
able authorities to allow for such claims when preparing fiscal estimates
for the future.41 These are very fine objectives as far as a defendant
city is concerned, but it should be readily apparent that any defendant
operating through agents and employees over a considerable area would
similarly applaud such a beneficent gesture in its behalf. To really
justify prior notice, it is necessary to find something in a municipality's
situation as to tort liability that differentiates it from the status of cor-
porate defendants generally.
Considering prior notice as one manifestation of a municipal tort
immunity that has its roots in the immunity enjoyed by'the state in such
matters, it is significant that "the king can do no wrong" concept is
the subject of sharp attack.42 The enactment of the Federal Tort
=" Foster v. Charlotte, 206 U. C. 528, 174 S. E. 412 (1934) ; Hartsell v. Ashe-
ville, 164 N. C. 193, 80 S. E. 226 (1913) ; Pender v. Salisbury, 160 N. C. 363, 76
S. E. 228 (1912).
"' Perry v. High Point, 218 N. C. 714, 12 S. E. 2d 275 (1940) ; Virginia Trust
Co. v. Asheville, 207 N. C. 162, 176 S. E. 257 (1934) ; Peacock v. Greensboro, 196
N. C. 412, 146 S. E. 3 (1928)." Note, 24 VA. L. Rxv. 86 (1937).
426 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, §§2792, 2793, 2794. PROSSER, LAW
OF TORTS §108 (1941) (see list of materials on this point in footnote 30) ; Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925); Borchard,
Government Liability in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927); Borchard,
Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 28 CoL. L. REv. 577 (1928); Borchard,
Theories of Governmental Responsibility it; Tort, 28 Col. L. REv. 734 (1928);
Borchard, State and Municipal Liability in Tort-Proposed Statutory Reform, 20
1948]
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Claims Act (which has no mandatory notice provision) is some of the
fruit of this spirited planting.43 As far as proprietary functions are
concerned, it has been generally understood for some time that a mu-
nicipal corporation is subject to the liabilities of the private law,4 4 but
as to governmental functions the courts are now embarrassed and at
times humiliated by doctrines of immunity that cannot be defended. 45
Confusion as to the distinction between proprietary and governmental
functions resulting in about as many functions being in the shadowland
between, as definitely in one or the other, is hastening the eventual
demise of municipal tort immunity.
Granting the difficulty of justifying the notice requirement on the
basis of the decaying concept of general municipal tort immunity, can
it be justified otherwise? Some who have attacked the basic principle
with vigor foresee a more pressing need for notice with the coming of
full municipal responsibility.48 The argument advanced, however, is
the old chant of fraud and imposition which was a major prop of the
doctrine of municipal immunity and one of the first to be attacked.
There is no justification that will bear close scrutiny, mainly because
there is nothing to distinguish municipal corporations from corporate
bodies generally except their public character, and it is this public char-
acter which has been exploded insofar as municipal liability for tort is
concerned.
Having a notice requirement, however, is it necessary to convert it
into "a trap and pitfall for the ignorant and unskillful" ?4 On appeal,
Virginia would have allowed the failure to plead notice to have been
interposed for the first time by the defendant city before the principal
case on grounds that it was a jurisdictional essential, and North Caro-
lina would reach the same logical result, for failure to allege notice
A. B. A. J. 747 (1934) (valuable list of materials on p. 748, n. 1) ; Fuller and
Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HAXv. L. REV. 437 (1941);
Green, Municipal Liability for Tort, 38 ILL. L. PRav. 355 (1944) ; Hobbs, The Tort
Liability of Municipalities, 27 VA. L. REv. 126 (1940); Peterson, Governmental
Responsibility for Torts in Minnesota, 26 MINN. L. Ray. 854, 874-879 (1942);
Symposium on Municipal Tort Liability, 5 LEGAL NOTES ON Loc. Gov. 351 (1940);
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
in this state is a failure to state a cause of action.48 The legislative
handicap of having to give notice is enough to inflict upon a plaintiff,
but to judicially handicap by placing the burden of pleading notice on
him is to slap his cheek the second time. It would seem that the mu-
nicipality which has been given such a fine legal weapon should be
required to utilize it, pleading failure to give notice within the period
specified as with other statutes of limitation. This would be in accord
with modern pleading tendencies to remove pitfalls in the way of honest
claimants.
If notice requirements are to be retained, there is need for a notice
statute of general application, for all municipalities should be accorded
the protection afforded by prior notice if it is a justified municipal safe-
guard. It would be to the interest of the bench, bar, and the public
generally to be rid of the galaxy of varying requirements now found in
our charters in favor of a requirement which would not make the charter
of the particular city where the injury occurs such an important con-
sideration. Such a step would remove much of the difficulty in con-
struction and serve to inform the public generally of the uniform hurdle
that all must face in suing a municipality in North Carolina. The fol-
lowing statute is proposed:
It shall be a good defense to an action brought against a
city or town for injury to person or property sustained by rea-
son of the negligence of the city or town, that a written state-
ment of the time and place where the injury was received, the
nature of the injury, and the amount of damages claimed was
not filed with the city or town attorney or the mayor within
90 days after the injury occurred: Provided, where the person
injured is an infant or non compos mentis such statement may
be filed within 180 days: Provided, further, that where the
action is for wrongful death the statement may be filed within
180 days of the date of death. All charter provisions for no-
tice of injury or presentation of tort claims to the city or




The evidence of the plaintiff tended to show that he was driving
40 to 45 miles per hour along a highway on a clear night, and that he
had just rounded a long curve and traveled over the crest of a small
hill when his automobile collided with an unlighted truck which was
"' MAcNTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §389 (1929).
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